The Federal Reserve must have a fantastic press agent. While critical inquiries into government bureaus abound, and citizen cynicism and distrust of elected officials and institutions run high, the Fed enjoys almost a free pass. We all know that the Fed is different, independent, apolitical. Indeed, usual scientific models of bureaucracy based on self-interest are generally assumed not to apply to the monetary bureaucracy.
If the Fed did not enjoy this special status, how would we model its behavior? Presumably we would be guided by the positive models of bureaucratic behavior that exist in both the economics and political science literature. We would examine the effect of presidential influence on Fed decisions. We would look for evidence of congressional influence and investigate whether changes in internal Fed leadership affect policy outcomes. Here we take up exactly this task. We ask the question, How much explanatory leverage on monetary policy can we achieve by modeling the It turns out that we can explain a lot about monetary policy by applying usual models of bureaucratic behavior. Using the real Fed Funds rate to measure monetary policy, we find that Republican presidents and more conservative leadership of the Senate Banking Committee are significantly correlated with tighter monetary policy. We also find that changes the chairmanship of the Fed are significantly correlated with changes in monetary policy.
Section I below is a review of the empirical literature of political models of Fed behavior. Section II explains our choice of monetary policy indicator. Section III presents the specific hypotheses we will test. Section IV contains our main empirical results and some specification tests, and Section V contains our conclusions.
I. Politics and the Federal Reserve
Empirical models of political influence on the Fed do exist, but they are frequently monocausal models, and to date, they have not had much effect on empirical macroeconomics. There are three general classes of models considered here: bureaucratic independence, presidential partisan, and congressional partisan.
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Perhaps the most widely held view in both economics and political science is that the Fed is an independent bureau. There are at least three versions of this model. First, the traditional macroeconomic version is that the Fed has some well-defined loss function made up entirely of macroeconomic variables that is minimized subject to the constraints inherent in the economy. This loss function is viewed as impervious to politics. Virtually all macroeconomic analyses of monetary policy proceed with this assumption.
Second, the public choice version is based on the Niskanen model of bureaucratic independence and argues that the Fed is free to pursue power, wealth, or the interests of commercial banks independent of any political control.
2 Mark Toma, Milton Friedman, and William Shughart and Robert Tollison all provide examples of this approach, which frequently concludes that bureaucratic autonomy imparts an inflationary bias to monetary policy. 3 The power of the Fed chairman is an important factor in a third class of independent bureau models. Besides nontechnical analyses of the ''Volcker recession'' and the ''Greenspan bull market,'' there is an economic literature that views the identity and preferences of the chairman as the major factor determining subsequent monetary policy. David Hakes makes this type of argument and presents supporting empirical work showing that a monetary policy reaction function has significantly different coefficients during the Burns years as Fed chair than during either the Martin or Volcker years. 4 Presidential partisan models are built on the assumption that liberal politicians are more concerned with unemployment (or growth) and less with inflation than are their conservative opponents and will thus pursue more expansionary policies. When applied to the United States, Democratic presidents are considered liberal relative to Republicans. Douglas Hibbs develops a such a model assuming an exploitable Phillips curve. He presents regression evidence that monetary policy is significantly easier under Democratic presidents. Later, Henry Chappell and William Keech and Alberto Alesina modify the partisan model to allow for rational expectations. However, their predictions about monetary policy are unchanged from Hibbs's original model: Democratic presidents will be associated with more expansionary policies. Nathaniel Beck challenges Hibbs by arguing that not all Democrats are alike and that a model using dummy variables for individual presidential administrations fits the data significantly better than does a model using only a party dummy. Dudley Luckett and Glenn T. Potts, Robert E. Weintraub, and Hakes also argue that presidential influence on the Fed is administration specific.
6 This is important because a party-based model has pre- 12 Their final model contains dummies for presidential administration along with a dummy for Republican party control of the Senate. However, there is no existing empirical work that allows for simultaneous executive, congressional, and bureaucratic influence on monetary policy. We take up this task in Section IV below after explaining our choice of policy variable and elucidating the specific hypotheses of interest.
II. The Real Fed Funds Rate as a Monetary Policy Measure
Choosing an empirical measure of monetary policy is not an easy task. There is a trade-off between picking a variable over which the Fed has direct and complete control (for example, the discount rate) and one that has important implications for the macro economy but is only very imperfectly controlled by the Fed in the short run (for example, the inflation rate). Historically, the debate has centered on the choice of a monetary aggregate versus an interest rate. However, given the breakdown of the relationship between narrow monetary aggregates and economic activity that began in the mid 1980s, the use of interest rates or interest-rate spreads to measure monetary policy is gaining widespread acceptance in empirical macroeconomics.
A number of recent papers show that interest rates and interest-rate spreads are robust predictors of economic activity. 13 Ben Bernanke argues that these variables work well because they contain information about the stance of monetary policy.
14 In fact, Bernanke and Alan Blinder show that over much of the past 30 years the Fed has implemented policy changes primarily through changes in the Federal Funds rate. 15 They conclude that the Funds rate may therefore be used as an indicator of policy stance. In this article we use the real Federal Funds rate, defined simply as the nominal rate less the actual inflation rate, as our measure of monetary policy. Using real rates is consistent with the empirical macroeconomic literature cited above since lags of the price level are included in those empirical studies.
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Real interest rates are what affect the macro economy, and nominal rates may often be poor indicators of real rate movements.
17 Yet one possible objection to using real rates to measure monetary policy is the argument that real interest rates are not affected by systematic economic policies. In fact, Eugene Fama argued that the real interest rate was constant, at least over the 1953-71 sample period he studied. 18 Fama's work inspired a stream of papers showing that the real rate does vary, and many of those papers show that policy affects real rates. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, in 1993 congressional testimony, acknowledged the Fed's influence over the real rates: ''Currently, short-term real rates, most directly affected by the Federal Reserve, are not far from zero; long-term rates, set primarily by the market, are appreciably higher. '' 19 Statistical models of the real rate have evolved from Fama's famous piece, claiming the real rate was basically constant, to William Schwert and 15 Benanke & Blinder, supra note 13. 16 This point is clearly made by id. at 905: ''Lags of the price level are included for comparability with previous literature and because it is presumably real money or real interest rates that effect real variables. '' 17 For example, in 1979, 3-month Treasury bills averaged a return of about 10 percent, yet with a corresponding inflation rate of almost 12.5 percent, people holding those bills actually became poorer. In contrast, the average nominal return on 3-month bills in 1986 was about 6 percent. However, given the inflation rate of 1.2 percent, the average real return to holding Treasury bills was 4.8 percent. Simply looking at nominal rates would lead one to the odd conclusion that policy was much more restrictive in 1979 than it was in 1986. Throughout the decade of the 1970s there is actually a negative and significant correlation between nominal and real interest rates.
18 Eugene Fama, Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 269 (1975) . 19 Alan Greenspan, Statement before the Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Credit Formation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, July 20, 1993 , 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 849, 853 (1993 (emphasis added).
Madelyn Antoncic, who argue that the real interest rate is actually nonstationary, to Pierre Perron and Rene Garcia, who show that the real rate is constant over substantial periods of time but subject to infrequent shifts in its mean. Caporale and Grier show that big political changes predict real rate shifts better than the time-series method used by Garcia and Perron over the Garcia-Perron sample period of 1961-86. 20 In the empirical work presented below, we expand the sample to also include the decade 1987-96, we switch from considering the real Treasurybill rate to the real Federal Funds rate, and most important, we seek to improve on Caporale and Grier by creating an empirical model with ex ante predictive power. The following section sets out the specific hypotheses we will examine.
III. Hypotheses
Our empirical work investigates the effects of bureaucratic structure, executive influence, both partisan and electoral, and the influence of Congress in an integrated political model of monetary policy. There are three hypotheses of particular interest.
Hypothesis 1. Do changes in the executive branch affect the real Funds rate, and if so, does party adequately capture these effects?
Hypothesis 2. Do changes in the composition of Congress affect real rates, and if so, is it in the overall Congress, the banking committees, or the committee's leadership?
Hypothesis 3. Do changes in the Fed chairmanship affect the real Funds rate, and if so, are chairs with previous Fed experience systematically different from chairs appointed from the outside, or are chairs appointed by Democrat presidents different from those appointed by Republicans?
The next section begins sorting out these hypotheses in a politics-only regression model and then proceeds to investigate the robustness of our results with a set of specification tests and by adding sets of macroeconomic variables. It is important to emphasize, however, that all our conclusions about political influence drawn from the politics-only model continue to hold in our later, macro-variables-included models. We use the two stages here only for convenience of exposition, not to influence the results. Note.-In each equation, three seasonal dummies are estimated but not reported to conserve space. Sample is 1961.1-1996.4, 144 quarterly observations. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics computed with a lag truncation parameter of 4. Fed insider chairs are Martin and Volcker.
IV. Results
Equation (1) of Table 1 presents a simple political model of the real Federal Funds rate. We use a dummy variable for Republican presidents and for each Fed chair except for Martin. The intercept thus measures the combined coefficients for Martin and Democratic presidents. To represent Congress we use an updated measure of Banking Committee preferences for monetary policy developed by Grier. 21 We take the average ADA score of each member for the length of time they serve on the committee and use that as fixed measure of their preferences. We then take an average of this average preference across the committee chair and the relevant subcommittee chairs (see appendices A and B for a listing of the members and their average ADA scores). Voting scores, if significant, provide more ex ante predictions than do party dummy variables.
Equation 1 of Table 1 shows that a more liberal Senate Banking Committee leadership is significantly negatively correlated (at the 0.01 level) with the real interest rate, while the House leadership has no significant effect. The coefficient for the Senate indicates that a 1-SD increase in the average ADA of the Senate committee leadership reduces the real Fed Funds rate by 0.98 percentage points, other factors held constant.
The Republican president dummy variable has a coefficient of 1.84 and is significant at the 0.01 level. Ceteris paribus, the real Fed Funds rate is almost 2 percentage points higher under Republicans. The Fed chair dummies are jointly significant at the 0.05 level, with the Burns and Miller dummies each negative and significant.
We find strong statistical evidence of systematic, predictable influence of politics on monetary policy. Perhaps the most surprising result here is that this simple political model accounts for about 60 percent of the quarterly variation in the real rate over the 36 years from 1961 to 1996.
A. Does Party Adequately Capture Executive Influence?
Equation (2) relaxes the constraint that all Republican administrations are alike and that all Democratic administrations are alike by replacing the Republican president dummy with separate administration-specific dummy variables. The Kennedy-Johnson administration is measured by the intercept (along with Fed Chair Martin) and Nixon-Ford, Carter, Reagan-Bush, and Clinton dummies are in the regression. The administration dummies do not add much to the party model in equation (1). The R 2 of equation (2) is only 0.005 higher, and a formal F-test cannot begin to reject the null hypothesis that the simple party dummy variable fits the data as well as the individual administration dummies.
In equation (2), the Senate Banking Committee leadership is still negative and significant at the 0.01 level, and the House committee leadership is still insignificant. The Fed chair dummies are still significant at the 0.05 level, and their coefficients and significance levels are little changed.
The ability to use a party variable supports earlier work of Hibbs and, as he stressed, converts the model from mere ex post explanation to one that can make ex ante predictions. The success of the party variable here also supports the partisan models common in the literature that take presidential party as the organizing political force.
B. Searching for Predictive Content in the Fed Chair Dummies
So far the model has ex ante predictions for the effect of legislative and executive branch changes on monetary policy. Here we examine whether there exists ex ante predictability for Fed chair changes. Equation (3) tests the hypothesis that Fed chairs can be grouped by whether or not they had previous Fed experience. We replace the four Fed chair dummies with a Fed Insider dummy that equals 1.0 for the Martin and Volcker years and 0.0 for the rest of the sample. The Fed Insider variable is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the real rate is significantly higher under a Fed chair with previous fed experience. However, the fit of the model is significantly worse in equation (3) than in equation (2). An F-test for the appropriateness of grouping Fed chairs by insider-outsider status rejects that hypothesis at the 0.01 level.
A second possibility is that Fed chairs could be grouped according to the party of the president that appointed them. Martin, Miller, and Volcker were appointed by Democratic presidents, while Burns and Greenspan were Republican president appointees. The weakness of this hypothesis can be clearly seen by examining the individual coefficients in equation (2) of Table 1. Both Burns and Miller have negative and significant coefficients, but one is a Republican-appointed chair, and the other a Democrat appointee. Replacing the individual Fed chair dummies with a Democrat appointee dummy lowers the R 2 of the model to 0.43. An F-test convincingly rejects the null hypothesis that the party of the appointing president can predict what effect a Fed chair will have on the real interest rate.
This last result indicates that the theoretical literature emphasizing the power of appointment may be in error. Fed policy is affected by the election of a Democratic president, even if the chair was previously appointed by a Republican. It also can help to explain why Volcker and Greenspan were reappointed by presidents of the opposite party that originally appointed them.
C. Is Banking Committee Leadership the Right Measure of Congressional Preference?
In Table 2 we take a closer look at the effect of congressional change on the real rate. We have constructed our committee leadership variable so that only changes in personnel will change our measure of committee preference. As Dan Wood and Richard Waterman point out, committee personnel change is often correlated with larger congressional change.
22 Therefore, it is not enough to show that our variable is significant; we need to investigate whether other congressional variables are also significant and, if so, which fit the data best.
Equation (1) of Table 2 replaces the committee leadership ADA scores with the average ADA score of the entire committee. Both of these variables have negative coefficients, but they are individually and jointly insignificant. Equation (2) considers the composition of the entire Congress. Since the average ADA score for a full chamber shows little time variation, we use instead the percentage of the chamber that belongs to the Democratic party. The percent Democrat in the Senate is negative and significant multiplicity of forces in the environment of the agency.'' We would of course replace the word ''impossible'' with the word ''important'' and argue that, for the Fed at least, we are doing exactly that. at the 0.01 level, while the percent Democrat in the House is completely insignificant.
To investigate which measure is the appropriate one, we simply put both in the same equation. These results are shown in equation (3) of Table 2 . The Senate Banking Committee leadership dominates the percent Democrat in the Senate as an influence on the real rate. The committee leadership variable is negative and significant at the 0.01 level, while the broader measure is completely insignificant.
Another way to gauge the appropriateness of our selection of the Senate Banking Committee as the major congressional influence variable is to consider the stability of its coefficient over time. It is difficult to conduct a straightforward Chow test for the stability of the overall equation because the model contains a number of dummy variables that cannot be estimated (because they equal zero throughout) over many subsamples. However, we can investigate the stability of our Congress variable by creating another dummy variable that equals 1.0 in the second half of our sample (from 1979.1-1996.4) and 0.0 in the first half, then interacting it with the Senate Banking Committee variable. If the significance of the committee variable is being driven by the changes in the party controlling the Senate in 1980 Senate in , 1986 Senate in , and 1994 , then the interaction term might be negative and significant, and the original coefficient insignificant.
However, this is not the case. In the regression described above, the coefficient on the Senate Banking Committee leadership is Ϫ1.20 with a t-statistic of 3.23, and the slope-shifting interaction term has a coefficient of Ϫ0.10 with a t-statistic of 0.45. We thus find no evidence that the effect of Senate Banking Committee leadership preferences on the real rate changes after 1978.
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D. Specification Tests
The political variables we use in our analysis are generally significant and together explain a substantial fraction of the variation in the real interest rate. Of course, it may well be the case that we have left relevant variables out. For example, we ignore the overall composition of the Board of Governors, and we do not explicitly consider the alleged 1979 experiment 23 We also estimated a nominal Fed Funds rate equation with the inflation rate included on the right-hand side. Rather than using least squares, though, we recognize that inflation and the nominal rate are simultaneously determined and thus use two-stage least squares with the inflation rate as an endogenous regressor. The basic results shown in Tables 1 and 2 are unaffected by this change. The political variables have the same signs, magnitudes, and significance levels as they did in our real rate equations, and the now freely estimated coefficient on inflation is almost exactly equal to 1.0. Given that our previous equation imposes such a value on the coefficient, it is important to show that the data do not reject it.
with monetarism undertaken by the Fed. One good way to check the validity of a model against some unspecified alternatives is to use a general specification test. If the equation fails, one can conclude that important factors are missing from the model. Here we perform the Ramsey RESET test 24 on equation (1) of Table 1 . The RESET test adds powers of the predicted values from the regression model in question into a new augmented model. For example, if the original model is y ϭ xB ϩ µ and y′ is the vector of fitted values from that regression, the Ramsey test estimates the model y ϭ xB ϩ ∑γ i y′ i ϩ µ. If the γ i s are jointly significant, we conclude that the existing model is inadequate. We have conducted Ramsey tests with i equal to 2, 3, and 4. In each case the test statistic is insignificant, indicating that we have not made an egregious error of omission.
E. Macro Variables
Finally, we show that our results about systematic political influence on monetary policy are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic variables as additional regressors. Economic theory suggests that both the supply and demand of investment funds should influence the real interest rate. To control for factors affecting the demand for investment funds, we use real stock returns, relative energy prices, and lagged investment. To control for the supply of loanable funds, we use the federal deficit, government spending, and growth in the monetary base. Appendices C and D give the exact definitions, sources, and summary statistics for all our variables.
Consider the demand for investment funds. In an efficient-market model, stock prices are based on the present value of expected future profits. Increases in the rate of return to the stock market are thus signals of increases in expected future economic growth and profits. Higher expected growth raises investment demand and the interest rate, assuming that other relevant factors are held constant. 25 Increases in the real price of energy are negative supply shocks that imply lower levels of future economic activity and therefore will reduce investment demand and lower the real rate of interest.
Turning to the supply side, traditional Keynesian macro models predict Note.-Three seasonal dummies are estimated but not reported to conserve space. Sample is 1961.1-1996.4, 144 quarterly observations. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics computed with a lag truncation parameter of 4. GNP ϭ gross national product.
that government borrowing to finance a deficit will reduce the amount of savings available for private investment. The reduction in the supply of loanable funds will tend to raise the real interest rate. A major controversy in macroeconomics is whether deficits do raise real interest rates, and the empirical evidence is mixed. 26 We include the deficit variable here without making any strong a priori prediction about its sign or significance. Finally, if the price level does not adjust instantly to increases in money, then a monetary expansion at least temporarily increases the real supply of funds (liquidity) in the economy, tending to lower the real rate of interest until the price level fully adjusts. We use monetary base (M0) growth as our liquidity variable. We measure the financial variables as continuously compounded growth rates and the spending variables as a percentage of gross national product (GNP). To lessen any potential simultaneity problems, we lag each variable one quarter. Table 3 adds the six macro variables discussed above, each lagged one quarter, to our basic political model. The six variables are jointly significant at the 0.01 level and raise the R 2 of the model from 0.597 to 0.653. Relative energy price growth is negative and significant at the 0.01 level, and the deficit is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. Investment is positive and significant at the 0.10 level, while the other three variables have the expected signs but are not individually significant. The equation reported in Table 3 produces the same set of conclusions regarding our three political hypotheses as does the politics-only models we have reported, and it passes the same set of specification tests applied to the politics-only model in the subsection above.
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V. Conclusion
The empirical work above demonstrates that the Federal Reserve is not so different from the International Trade Commission or the Federal Trade Commission or any other federal bureau in that at least one of its outputs, monetary policy, is significantly affected by political changes. While it is true that presidents have a lot of other things to do, that formal congressional oversight is sporadic and unsophisticated, and that the Fed scores reasonably high in cross-national indexes of legal independence, our results are too strong to be swept aside by quibbles over the lack of overt control. Politics matters and knowledge about political changes can help forecast monetary policy.
In the 1961-96 sample studied here, presidential influence can be adequately captured with a party variable, supporting the partisan models of Hibbs, Chappell and Keech, and Alesina. Congressional influence comes through the leadership of the Senate Banking Committee, supporting previous work by Grier and Havrilesky. Finally, although we show that changes in the identity of the Fed chair significantly change monetary policy, the direction of these changes are not ex ante predictable. We find that monetary policy under Fed chair insiders is tighter than under outsiders, but the data do not fully accept the restriction; individual chairman dummies fit the data better.
Our work illustrates the utility of political economy models in empirical macroeconomics. Models of Fed behavior can no longer be based on out-ward appearances or ''common knowledge'' or the internal propaganda of the organization. Spending Ratio: Government spending on goods and services as a percentage of GNP. The ratio of the Citibase variables GGE to GNP is multiplied by 100.
Deficit Ratio: The ratio of the federal budget deficit to GNP. The ratio of the Citibase variables GGFNET to GNP is multiplied by 100.
Energy: The annualized growth rate of the real price of crude petroleum. The relative price of petroleum was obtained by dividing its producer price index (PW57) by the overall producer price index (PW).
Committee Leadership: The average ADA scores for the Senate and House chairs of the Banking Committee chair and two subcommittees that oversee the Fed over the full period that the elected officials held a leadership position (from the Congressional Quarterly and the ADA).
Full Committee: The year-to-year average ADA scores of the entire Senate and House Banking Committees.
Percent Democrat: The percentage of seats in the Senate and House held by legislators from the Democratic party (from the Congressional Quarterly). 
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